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Introduction
The term apartheid is now used in many contexts to denote systematic racial separation and
exploitation. A long tradition in South African studies has sought to explain apartheid by
reference to the changing forms and needs of capitalist exploitation, but comparatively little
attention has been paid to the apparently more exclusive racial aspects of this policy. The
Group Areas Act (GAA), passed in 1950, is a case in point. This Act became one of the
cornerstones and arguably the flagship of the government's segregationist policies. The
implementation of the GAA resulted in the forcible removal of hundreds of thousands of
blacks from their homes and their relocation into racially exclusive areas. Much of the human
misery caused by these policies has been well documented. The dismantling of integrated
communities in urban and peri-urban areas such as the Western Areas in Johannesburg,
District Six in Cape Town and Cato Manor in Durban have long captured the imagination of
scholars and the general public. The removal of Sophiatown in particular has been the subject
of numerous scholarly and popular works.1
But aside from the one important piece by Alan Mabin on the origins of the GAA2 our
knowledge about its implementation remains limited. His study however only covers the
period up to the early fifties. Surprisingly few studies have focused on the integral part played
by this Act in the making of apartheid and the racial restructuring of the urban areas. There
are clearly important gaps in our understanding of the GAA. One of these is the lack of
clarity on the reasons behind the often long delay in the final implementation of group areas
in many localities. In some cases, as this paper will show, group areas were only finally
implemented in the 1970s. This is significant considering that at the time of the GAA's
promulgation, the average urban area was already up to 90 percent segregated.3 The mass
struggles of the fifties, nationally and locally, did not focus on the GAA. On the surface it
may appear therefore that the implementation of the GAA should not have too arduous a task.
The delay in the implementation of the GAA may even seem peculiar considering the fervent
commitment of the National Party to racial segregation. The rule of the Nationalists, unlike
that of its predecessors, was characterised by a singular determination to implement apartheid
policies. It pursued its goal of complete racial segregation not only with greater co-ordination
and planning but as its hold over the state became more secure, also with increasing coercion. •
Once in power the National Party promulgated a battery of laws designed to fulfil its broad
aims: the Group Areas Act, Population Registration Act, Mixed Marriages Act, among others,
signalled the apartheid government's determination to impose complete racial segregation and
simultaneously to strike a blow against the radical opposition movement.
A serious shortcoming in the extant literature is the dearth of proper and detailed analyses of
the 1960s. Most histories of the making of apartheid concentrate on the period up to 1960.
Others focus on the re-awakening of the proletariat in the early-seventies and the ensuing
struggle for freedom. The impression is left that the sixties was indeed a dark decade,
characterised by the unbridled success of the Nationalists. This gap in the literature means that
our understanding of the implementation of apartheid remains incomplete.
This paper attempts to address these issues through a case study of Springs during the first
two and a half decades of apartheid, with a special focus on the sixties. The making of
apartheid is viewed from the perspective of the implementation of the GAA, urban
restructuring and the various forms of opposition to these plans. The GAA and the forced
removals of tens of thousands of black people were not merely consequences of the National
Party's desire to enforce racial segregation, although this was of course crucial. The urban
restructuring policies pursued by the Nationalists were a reaction to the socio-political
consequences of a rapidly industrialising economy. The urban crisis of the late forties -
massive overcrowding of locations and the increasing militancy of the nascent working class
- demanded decisive action from the ruling class and the state. The desire to control the urban
black population, to ensure a reliable supply of cheap labour for the growing needs of capital
and the enforcement of racial segregation formed the basis of the plans to restructure the
urban areas.
A study of the implementation of the GAA also allows for reflection on some of the key
analyses on the making of apartheid. In particular, Posel s critique of the master plan
approach has been extremely influential. Her writings have emphasised that the very notion
of apartheid was contested within the state. Thus the implementation of apartheid cannot be
viewed as a cumulative process, originating with the Sauer report.4 To a certain extent the
implementation of the GAA confirms the wisdom of this approach. There was nothing in the
Sauer report indicating how group areas would be enforced. In fact, during the first half of
the fifties very little happened in the way of group area demarcations, largely because of
shortcomings in the GAA. However, by the mid fifties the government had formulated a well
developed plan to match its ideological commitment to racial segregation.
From this point the restructuring of the urban areas was pursued, perhaps more so than influx
control, with virtual unanimity throughout the state. Opposition from liberal-controlled
municipalities was limited and was not directed against the political essence of this policy.
Moreover, it does not appear that the conflict in the state over the meaning of apartheid made
a fundamental difference to the actual implementation of group areas, forced removals, the
creation of new townships and the general restructuring of the urban areas - all which were
pivotal in the making of apartheid.
These plans were of course contested at the point of implementation, with varying degrees
of success. It is at this level of the practical implementation of apartheid policies that the
paper focuses. In so doing the paper necessarily highlights the experiences of ordinary black
people.
A. PLANNING AND RESTRUCTURING URBAN AREAS
The Group Areas Act: from inertia to consolidation
The GAA was pivotal in the Nationalist's plans to enforce racial segregation. The government
was determined not only to set racial segregation on a new footing, but also to reverse
existing practices of racial integration. A fundamental aspect of these plans was the removal
of the racially integrated locations found in numerous urban centres - the so called "black
spots". These locations were problematic to the government because of their racial
heterogeneity and because they had become major centres of black working.class mobilisation
in the post-war period. Their continued existence thus posed a threat to the National Party s
ideal of racial segregation.
The rapid and successful establishment of group areas was of paramount importance to a
government committed to racial exclusivity. However, the promulgation of the GAA in 1950
was not followed by immediate success in its implementation. Between 1950 and 1957 the
government faced numerous obstacles to and inadequacies in its own plans. The GAA was
in fact quite weak in its exposition of practical plans of implementation. Six years after its
0promulgation only five group areas had been declared.5 Meshtrie has argued that the
government did not intend group areas proclamations to occur quickly. According to her the
Act ensured that some time would lapse before a group area could be declared because of the
lengthy procedures which had to be followed.6 But it is unlikely that the government would
have planned or anticipated the kinds of delays experienced with the implementation of the
GAA, Certainly, the ideologues of apartheid and their supporters would not have planned for
the creation of group areas to take over two decades.
The implementation of the GAA was initially retarded by various administrative shortcomings.
One of the first obstacles faced by the Land Tenure Advisory Board (LTAB), which was
responsible for overseeing the implementation of the GAA, was uncertainty over the number
of "racial groups" identified by the government. Racial group areas could of course not be
created until the government had decided how to subdivide Indians and coloureds. Once this
process was completed the LTAB could then declare an area controlled, specified or defined,
the precursors to the full declaration of group areas. When an area was earmarked for group
area demarcation permits had to be issued to those people who then resided in the "wrong"
location. Similarly, businesses operating outside their designated group area also had to apply
for permits. These permit applications had to be investigated, taking up a considerable amount
of the LTAB s time. In 1951-52 the LTAB issued 581 permits but by 1958-59 this had
escalated to 3395.7 The government was obliged to increase the size of the LTAB bureaucracy
to deal with such details.
More seriously, however, was the opposition mounted by the South African Indian Congress
(S.A.I.C.) which effectively used the administrative shortcomings in the GAA to delay its
implementation. This was made possible because initially LTAB hearings to decide on group
area demarcations, were open to all affected parties. In 1953, for example, the S.A.I.C.
demanded that members of the LTAB sitting at Lydenburg should recuse themselves because
they were not impartial. Although this was not acceded to, the LTAB was forced to test the
matter in court. The result was a delay of nine months before the Board could proceed with
its plans. Interventions of this kind occurred in most centres with Indian populations and
frustrated the smooth operation of the LTAB.
Opposition from white local authorities also delayed the creation of group areas. The refusal
by the Uitenhage Council to implement the GAA because it would adversely affect coloured,
Indian and Chinese businesses delayed the creation of group areas in that town.8 Nationally
there were some councillors who opposed the GAA in principle, but the majority of them,
including liberals, supported the Act. Opposition to the GAA very often arose because
Councils were reluctant to carry the financial burden of implementing group areas.9
The initial successes scored by these forces in delaying the implementation of group areas was
perhaps more indicative of the relative weakness of the National Party in the early fifties vis-a
vis the local authorities and the increasingly militant black urban population. At this stage the
government still found it necessary to have open hearings, consult widely with local
authorities and even tolerate objections from the black population. As its electoral position
became more secure and weaknesses of the black opposition effectively to prevent forced
removals became apparent after the implementation of the Western Areas Removal Scheme,
the Nationalists were able to proceed more systematically with it plans.
The opposition from the S.A.I.C. and some liberal-controlled Councils also alerted the
government to the shortcomings in the Act. As a result the original Act was amended on
numerous occasions and in 1957 the Group Areas Amendment Act was passed, incorporating
all the amendments made to the original Act. In addition the Group Areas Development Act
was passed in 1955, which established the Group Areas Board. The cumulative effect of these
amendments was to give the central government, and the Group Areas Board specifically,
greater power to ensure compliance from local authorities. These amendments prevented
anyone who did not propose the establishment of a group area from attending hearings of the
Board, thereby effectively excluding opposition groups. The 1957 Act represented a turning
point in the establishment of group areas. In the next two years the number of group areas
declared increased to 170.10 An important trump card held by the central government was its
threat to withhold finance for housing, without which Councils would not have been able to
tackle the black housing crisis. In this way it was able to force compliance from Councils.
Thus by the mid-fifties the government had overcome most of the legal shortcomings in the
GAA and had laid the foundation for the speedy implementation of group areas. The
consolidation of the GAA was accompanied by the formulation of clearer plans for urban
restructuring.
Regional Planning
A key feature of the National Party's approach to urban restructuring was its emphasis on
"proper planning"." The early 1950s were thus characterised by the most serious attempts by
any government to date to formulate a clear urban policy. Many commissions and studies
were initiated by the government to achieve this aim. It was out of these attempts that the
basic premises of the 'apartheid city' were derived, including the policy to eliminate "black
spots" and to create regional townships. The emergence of these new townships, both in their
structure and siting, epitomised the essential apartheid notions of social engineering and
"grand planning".
An important feature of the government's modus operandi at the time was its greater reliance
on internal and closed committees to formulate plans. These committees often did not have
statutory powers and were accountable only to important government departments and
influential ministers. Central in these schemes was the Native Affairs Department and
especially its minister, H.F. Verwoerd, who preferred dealing with matters outside the public
eye. Thus the nexus of power in matters dealing with national urban planning shifted to a
smaller group of politicians centred around the likes of Verwoerd, W.M. Eiselen and T.
Donges. Key members from their departments such as Mentz, Moolman, Barker and Nel
became the most influential figures in the regional planning schemes of the Witwatersrand.
Between them they had a hand in most of the committees set up to develop policy on urban
restructuring. These individuals shared a common political vision for the country's urban areas
which they were keen to impose on local authorities.
The basic principles applied to the siting and planning of African townships were outlined by
Verwoerd to the Senate in May 1952. They were:
1. The site should be at an adequate distance from the European town;
2. It should preferably adjoin the location of a neighbouring town, so as to
decrease rather than increase the number of Native areas;
3. It should preferably be separated from the European area by an industrial
buffer where industries exist or are being planned;
4. It should have provision for an adequate hinterland for expansion
stretching away from the European area;
5. It should be within easy distance of the town or city for transport
purposes, by rail rather than by road;
6. It should have a road of its own connecting the location site with the city,
preferably running through the industrial areas;
7. It should possess open buffer zones around the proclaimed location areas,
the breadth of which should depend on whether the location borders upon
a densely or sparsely occupied European area; and
8. It should be at a considerable distance from main, and more particularly
national roads, the use of which as local transport routes for the location
should be totally discouraged.12
These guidelines contain the essential aims of racial segregation in terms of the spatial
separation between whites and blacks. Important too, however, is the recognition that new
townships had to be sited favourably in relation to industrial areas. The latter, it was
envisaged, could then also act as buffer zones between the different residential areas.
Although these guidelines were not consolidated into official government policy they
nevertheless served as the basic framework for the various commissions entrusted with the
formulation of new urban plans. Here we will focus on the impact of the above guideline on
the restructuring of the Witwatersrand and the East Rand specifically.
The Mentz Committee (also known as the "black spots" committee), formed by Verwoerd
in 1952, operated very strictly within this framework. Ostensibly set up as a fact-finding body
to investigate the "question of townships for Natives in the Witwatersrand and Vereeniging
region", the Mentz Committee became the de facto source of government plans to create
regional African townships on the Witwatersrand. At the end of its deliberations, which
consisted primarily of meetings with local authorities and businesses, the Committee
proposed the removal of all "black spots" and the creation of regional townships. For the
East Rand it suggested the development of two major township complexes: one based around
Kwa-Thema (for Springs, Brakpan) and the other based around Katlehong (for Germiston,
Alberton, Boksburg and Elsburg. These proposals created the basis for the present day
complexes of KwaTsaDuza and Katorus. The government s acceptance of the Mentz
Committee s recommendation in August 1955 represented a turning point in the reshaping
of the urban areas and in the lives of the residents of integrated locations in particular.
The Mentz Committee was not the only body established to consider the future of the
Witwatersrand. In December 1952 the acting Minister of Economic Affairs, J.F. Naude,
announced the creation of the Subsidiary Planning Committee (SPC) under the chairmanship
of Dr J.H Moolman, who was also a member of the Mentz Committee.13 In his motivation
to the press Naude indicated that the idea of a more permanent planning committee for the
Witwatersrand area originated with Verwoerd at the time of the establishment of the Mentz
Commission.14 Although it was declared to be merely an advisory body, the SPC, like the
Mentz Commission, actually formulated government policy pertaining to the regional
restructuring and planning of the Witwatersrand.15 At its first meeting held in January 1953,
the chairman of the NRDC, F.J. du Toit explained to delegates the main purpose of the new
committee:
In the past the one department or local authority seldom knew what its
neighbours were planning and each one was just carrying on its own.... this
Committee will provide an opportunity for automatic consultation with the
result that various aspects of development will no longer clash with one
another.16
The directive from the government was unambiguous - the ad hoc development of the
Witwatersrand had to cease. Henceforth, proper planning and co-ordination would
characterise the state's attitude to urban development. It was envisaged that the SPC would
play a key role in co-ordinating the planning of the Witwatersrand. The SPC considered all
the key aspects of urban planning, namely, the future of mining, the location of industrial
sites and the creation of regional townships for blacks. From the point of view of the
government and the leading figures in these committees the SPC and the Mentz committees
would operate in tandem. In fact the proposals made by Mentz were incorporated into the
general plans of the SPC. The latter committee, one member proposed, "should aim at the
preparation of a master plan within which private enterprise can operate..."17 It was agreed
that "co-ordination can only be achieved through voluntary co-operation" but in the event that
such co-operation was not forthcoming the government threatened to proclaim an area a
controlled area, which would make consultation with the SPC obligatory.18
The SPC established various committees to investigate the different aspects of urban and
regional planning for the Witwatersrand. Two of the most important of these committees
were the Minerals and Mining committee, and the Group Areas committee. The latter was
chaired by M.C. Barker, another member of the Mentz Commission. This committee played
a crucial role in the division of the region into group areas for coloureds, Indians and whites.
In its report the Subsidiary Planning Committee explained its basic 'principles and work
methods', which not surprisingly coincided largely with those set out by the Native Affairs
Department. The committee aimed, in accordance with the GAA, to devise a system of
"planning that would allow each group the opportunity to develop on their own and at the
same time to ensure the most convenient transport to workplaces without the need for one
group to move through the area of another group to reach their workplaces".19 By the
beginning of 1955 the committee had completed its investigations and put forward very
detailed plans for the region. Its report on the East Rand included maps with clear
demarcations of group areas for the region as well as for the individual towns. The proposals
presented by this committee, as with the Mentz Committee, were profoundly to influence the
future planning and development of the East Rand. It proposed to establish a separate East
Rand regional township for Indians and coloureds. The residential plans for all black
townships were very closely linked to proposals about the siting of industrial areas to ensure
compliance with the government's basic guidelines.
It is apparent therefore that the National Party used the first few years of its rule to formulate
clear plans for the restructuring of the urban areas. This was especially true for the
Witwatersrand. Success in the economic heartland was vital. Failure in this region would
have dealt a serious blow to the government's apartheid schemes. The government thus
expended considerable energy and time to ensure that proper plans were formulated.
B. THE FIRST PERIOD: 1948 - 1962
The post war crisis in Springs
The founding and initial growth of Springs, like other Reef towns, was integrally linked to
the fortunes of the mining industry. Springs started as a mining camp and was initially
almost entirely dependent on the coal mining industry. For a time it appeared that the mining
camp would be short-lived as the prospects of coal mining dwindled.. However, the
discovery of gold assured the permanency of the settlement and its development into a town.
The 1930s and 1940s were boom decades for gold mining in the region and some Springs
mines were among the most profitable in the world. In the 1940s, mines in the municipal
area produced approximately 25% of the country's gold and in the late 1940s the
Daggafontein mine was the largest single producer in the world.20 The mining industry
created the basis for industrial development. From the late 1930s the council also intervened
more directly in stimulating the development of secondary industry. Its efforts were
particularly successful in the late 1940s,21 as it succeeded in attracting national and foreign
investment. The subsequent economic expansion transformed the town's industry from its
parochial focus on mining to being rapidly integrated into the national industrial economy.
The industrial development of Springs resulted in a rapid growth of the town's population.
In 1930 the total population of Springs was 34 455 but this nearly quadrupled over the next
two decades to 124 100.22 Of the total population in 1950, Africans constituted nearly seventy
percent and white about thirty percent. The combined Indian and coloured population in that
year was just over 2000.23 In the early fifties the majority of Africans still lived in the mine
compounds. The rest of the black population lived in the backyards of the white areas and
in Payneville, the town s "black spot".
The location was divided into two. The main section, which was surrounded by a fence, was
occupied by coloureds and Africans. The former were mainly found in a section known as
Cape Stands (called such because of the assumption that all coloureds were from the Cape)
but there was no formal racial segregation. On the contrary, the location was characterised
by residential, social and religious integration between coloureds and Indians. A street
separated this section from the Asiatic Bazaar (later known as Bakerton) where the Indian
and Chinese population resided. This section was also the main commercial centre of the
location. Kenny Madalane, who now leads the campaign to reclaim Payneville, vividly
remembers the relationship between the residents from the different areas:
I was right there in Cape Stands where the coloureds were... We had a very
good relationship with coloured families. We married one another, it was
just mixed marriages. When you take it with the Indian community, we used
to go and shop there. They used to come and sell bananas, samoosas and
other things. They went house to house and there was nothing wrong. I don't
remember having a problem with Indians and Chinese, who also came into
the township with what we call Fafee.2*
Payneville was originally designed to accommodate 8000 people but by 1952 the number of
residents had escalated to 33 000, making it hopelessly overcrowded.25 Between 1939 and
1951 the Council did not build any houses in the location, resulting in a proliferation of
squatters and intense pressure on the existing resources. Banzi Bangani, trumpeter for the
African Jnkspots, recalls that his father's stand was filled by shacks.26 Not surprisingly under
these conditions, poverty was pervasive: 47% of the population could not afford to pay rents
without resorting to informal means of income generation.27- From the late forties the
Council's medical officer regularly complained of the dangers of outbreaks of poverty related
diseases. In 1950 there was an outbreak of diphtheria and about 800 people reported at the
clinic with tuberculosis.28 In 1952/53 the infant mortality rate among Africans and coloureds
was 383.77 and 166.66 per thousand live births respectively, compared to only 41.01 for
whites.29
In the post-war period these conditions became unbearable and underpinned many of the
struggles waged against the authorities. One result of these struggles was the rapid growth
in support in the location for the ANC and Communist Party of So.uth Africa. The latter was
particularly successful in gaining control of the Advisory Board. Under the leadership of
Dinah Maile, the CPSA focused its attention in the mid forties on struggles against municipal
beer brewing and the harassment of women brewers. In 1945 a clash broke out between
women protesters and the police, resulting in numerous deaths. Protests against raids of illicit
brewers and the high cost of municipal continued until the early fifties. By 1950 residents'
anger over the lack of housing reached boiling point when more than a thousand people
marched to the city demanding that the Council build houses. This increased militancy of
Payneville's population clearly shocked the Council, business and the white population in
general. Under the pressure of these events the Council moved rapidly to establish an
"emergency camp", known as Jabavu, to alleviate the overcrowding in Payneville.
Demarcating group areas for Springs
In 1939 the Council was already aware of the need to provide alternative accommodation for
the black population. However, it took another decade before agreement could be reached
about the siting of the new township. By the late forties the Council had already decided to
create a new African township. Initially, therefore, the establishment of KwaThema did not
yet form part of the central government's plans. Only when the Mentz Commission begun
formulating its policies did the creation of KwaThema become an integral part of the regional
plans for the establishment of African townships.
The key aspects of the urban replanning in Springs were the disestablishment of Payneville
as an African location and the removal of all Africans to the new township, KwaThema; the
imposition of tighter influx control to ensure that the African population in the municipality
corresponded to the labour needs of industry, and the creation of group areas for Indians and
coloureds.
Initially there was some division in the Council over the effects the GAA would have on te
black population. Some Council members took their cue from the South African Bureau of
Racial Affairs (SABRA). For example, they found the input of V.G. Hiemstra, a strong
supporter of the GAA, at a conference of SABRA on the Act, "a very useful analysis for
future reference, as it sets out the main essentials of the Group Areas Act in an unusually
clear and understandable form."30 Liberal Councillors (who generally took their cue from the
South African Institute of Race Relations and the Joint Councils) initially objected to the
impact the GAA would have on black people. However, they did not oppose segregation and
proceeded to draw up plans for the establishment of group areas. In 1952 the Council
proposed that KwaThema be the main African location and that Payneville should be retained
as a location for all black people, albeit enforcing clearer segregation.31 At this stage it did
not propose the disestablishment of Payneville and viewed the creation of KwaThema
primarily as a means to ameliorate the congestion in the old location.
In 1954 the Council adopted the Mentz Committee s recommendations, the essence of which
was the abolition of Payneville and the removal of all African people to KwaThema.32 This
represented an important turning point in the restructuring of Springs and in the lives of the
town s black population. The Council now proceeded rapidly to implement plans to remove
Africans from Payneville to KwaThema, where housing construction was also accelerated.
The removal of Africans from the old location would leave only coloureds and Indians. The
Council therefore proposed that Bakerton and Payneville be declared group areas for Indians
and coloureds respectively.
The Group Areas Board hearings in Springs to consider recommendations for the
establishment of group areas took place in November 1957. Submissions.from companies
such as Anglo American Corporation were generally supportive of the government's
proposals. The most important representation came from the Geduld Proprietary Mines, which
owned parts of the land on which Payneville and Bakerton33 In its written submission the
mining company indicated its preference for Payneville to be proclaimed a white group area.
It objected to the continued provision of housing for coloureds and Indians in the old location
because it meant that these people would have to travel through the town to get to the main
industrial areas. In a thinly veiled threat to the Council, the company indicated it would want
to be compensated if the land was used for anyone other than whites.34 At the hearings the
companies also supported proposal of the Mentz Committee that the development of locations
for Africans should be dealt with regionally and urged the Board to take a similar approach
in relation to coloureds and Indians.35
The only serious opposition to these proposals came from the Indian community who were
represented at the hearings by advocates Ishmail Mohamed (now Justice Mohamed) and
Braam Fischer. Their primary concern was to emphasise the damage the implementation of
group areas would have on Indian businesses, especially those located in the centre of the
town.36 The lawyers arranged that all concerned businesses should make individual written
submissions. The letters written to the Board reflected the desperation of small Indian
businessmen:
I am tailor and hereby wish to place on record my objections the above
notice on various grounds that the above ideas as proposed on map in town
hall at Springs will have the result of depriving me of my livelihood and
will ruin me altogether. It will drastically effect (sic) my wife and children
and upset my brother and his wife and children in health and belonging.37
These appeals for the Council not to implement group areas fell on deaf ears. At the end of
the GAB sitting in Springs, the Council, business and the central government had reached
agreement on the basic racial division of the town: Springs would be declared a white group
area, except for KwaThema and Payneville. The former would be exclusively for African
occupation while the future of coloured and Indian residents would be dependent on the
government's regional plans.
The rise of KwaThema: reform find resistance
Housing construction in KwaThema commenced in 1952. In the first two years 2226
municipal houses were built and the township's population grew to 13 894. By 1958 there
were over 6000 municipal houses and the population had swelled to 34 838338. The provision
of housing was intended to ameliorate the living conditions in the old location. But the
creation of new townships and the provision of housing were also part of the state's plans to
assert greater control over the African population.
Between 1952 and 1957 Payneville's population experienced a precipitous decline from 33
000 to 9820,39 indicating a massive transfer of the old location's people to Kwathema.
Significantly, these transfers were primarily voluntary, although some people who lost their
houses in the tornado which struck the town in 1952 were not given any choice. To the
thousands of people living in overcrowded conditions the provision of housing was viewed
as an improvement in their lives. For the lodgers and squatters who were forced to cram into
small rooms and corrugated iron constructions, and who were frequently the victims of
unscrupulous landlords, the idea of living in their own house was a big step forward. Jimmy
"5000" Jacobs was one of the last people to leave Payneville in the late seventies and
therefore witnessed the decline of the location from the early fifties. For him the rush to get
a house in KwaThema was understandable because "people would rather be a landlord
somewhere in the bundu than be subservient to a landlord in the location."40
Young men like Banzi Bangani were also keen to get their own houses in KwaThema and
in that way escape the control of their parents. He remembers being extremely excited when
he was granted a house in KwaThema. There was very little possibility of this occurring in
Payneville. Not surprisingly, therefore, the official number of lodgers in Payneville declined
by nearly 80% in the five years between 1953 and 1958.41 By this time the housing situation
in the old location had improved considerably.
The Springs municipality boasted that KwaThema was a model township. It had conducted
thorough research on housing needs and township planning before embarking on construction
of the new area. KwaThema was also the first township to be built exclusively by African
labour. The township was also one of the best lit in the country. These achievements made
KwaThema the model for other local authorities to strive towards.42
However, beneath this glossy veneer numerous problems began to arise. The Council's
emphasis on finding a quick and cheap solution to the housing problem inevitably
compromised housing quality. In 1955 the KwaThema Advisory Board complained that house
walls started cracking less than three months after their construction. Board member, Mr
Ngakane, articulated the views of many residents when he told the Council that "If perhaps
these cracks came out after say a period of a year no one would have reason to complain.
But the fact that the houses cracked as soon, almost, as the houses were completed, the
Board felt that not much care was exercised in the building of the houses."43 The Council's
response to this criticism was to promise the appointment of an inspectorate to investigate
the matter. Most houses in the new township also did not have electricity. The official
position was that only when 60% of people in area wanted electricity would it be provided.
In addition it was estimated that the installation of electricity would probably cost about £50
per house, placing it well out of the reach of the majority of residents.44
More serious, however, was the difference in rent between the two locations. The socio-
economic survey commissioned by the Council in 1952 concluded that most of the residents
earmarked for removal to KwaThema would not be able to afford sub-economic rentals.45
This was simply ignored by the authorities. Rather than build affordable houses for everyone
the municipality built economic and sub-economic dwellings irrespective of whether people
could afford the rents. In October 1955 the government passed legislation stipulating that no
African person whose annual income exceeded £180 was entitled to sub-economic housing.
Moreover, the Director of Native Affairs in Springs reported to the KwaThema Advisory
Board that after the construction of 1979 sub-economic houses in KwaThema the Council
could not get any more funding for such houses and that it would only be able to build
economic houses.46
At that stage sub-economic rentals varied between £1.2.6 to £2.2.6, whereas economic rentals
ranged between £2.15.0 and £3.00.47 In Payneville the majority of occupants of municipal
houses paid less than £1.18.0 per month.48 For lodgers, who constituted the majority of new
tenants in KwaThema the increase in rentals was dire. The estimated average income of a
black male in 1955 was about £11,49 meaning that the majority could not afford to live in
economic houses. Even those who earned in excess of £15 a month ( £180 per annum) found
it difficult to pay economic rentals. The government's calculations did not take into account
that many families only had one wage earner and that £15 was far below the cost of
subsistence for a family which was calculated to be about £20.50 In addition KwaThema
residents had to bear the extra costs of transport to town and their workplaces. By the
beginning of 1957 there was growing discontent in the community. At a joint meeting of the
Payneville and KwaThema Advisory Boards Absolom Khumalo and Dinah Maile tabled a
motion proposing
that the Council should discontinue building Economic Leeting (sic) houses
for the simple and obvious reason that they impose an unnecessary
financial burden on the occupants of such dwellings. Occupiers of such
houses are unable to pay high rentals. The reason why some of the people
hardly occupy the houses for at least six months and why arrears in rent
in Kwa-Thema reach a sum of £2,600 should be obvious to the Council.
It would be reasonable enough if the wages of the people could be brought
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to what the government at present as an Economic level (i.e. £15), or else
the line of demarcation for a person to qualify under the Economic group
be at least £25 ... the high rents imposed on ill-paid people cause an
unsettlement in the location.51
Many simply defaulted on rent payments. The authorities responded by expelling people from
the township but found it very difficult to replace them with people who could afford the
rent. In 1958/59 a total of 224 people were forced to vacate their houses. Of these 59 people
were expelled from the location and 111 were transferred to cheaper houses. In addition 104
people were transferred from economic houses to sub-economic houses because of rent
defaults.52
The mounting problems faced by the residents of Kwathema influenced the attitude of the
remaining people in Payneville, who became more reluctant to leave the old location. As a
result the population of Payneville increased for the first time between 1957 and 1958 since
the development of KwaThema.53 This was partly because fewer houses were built in
KwaThema but was also the result of the return by some people to Payneville, especially
those expelled from KwaThema. In 1959 the Council reacted by proposing an increase in
rents by as much as 100% in Payneville. It hoped in this way to make Payneville less
attractive economically and thus weaken the growing resistance to the removal of the
location.
The growing discontent over economic rentals, the poor quality of houses in KwaThema and
the deteriorating conditions in Payneville were some of the key factors underlying the
renewed struggles in the late fifties and early sixties. The conditions in Springs reflected the
national situation. Opposition to the authorities was mainly centred in the old location but
it came from various quarters.
The Payneville Advisory Board campaigned in the interests of the small elite. The Board
wanted assurances from the Council that traders, taxi-owners, professionals such teachers,
nurses and ministers of religion, and people who made a living from sub-letting would be
able to carry on with their livelihoods in the new township.54 They also requested that
freehold rights be granted to those who moved to KwaThema. Fearing that they would lose
their means of income Payneville's elite threw their weight behind the demand to oppose the
disestablishment of the location.
An important area of conflict between the authorities and the African population was the
former's stricter application of influx control. In particular, from the mid fifties the Council
resolved to enforce section 10 of the Urban Areas Act and to restrict the influx of women
into the municipal area. Pass harassments escalated over the nest few years, despite the
objections of the Advisory Board and numerous women's delegations. In 1958 alone more
than 2000 women were issued with passes. This sparked off further protests by women from
the location. The Council and police banned a pass protest meeting, fearing that such a
mobilisation could affect the whole location.
These protests coincided with the resurgence of protests nationally. However, the struggles
in Springs remained sporadic and ineffective. The black population of Springs does not
appear to have been heavily involved in the post-Sharpeville political mobilisation. There
were attempts by Congress activists to gain support for the General Strikes but these met
with little success. There is no record of any serious political mobilisation in KwaThema. The
key Congress activists, such as Maile, still resided in the old location. They continued to
concentrate their activity here, effectively cutting themselves off from the majority of black
residents who lived in the new township. By the early sixties the radical black opposition in
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Springs had been silenced.
C. THE SIXTIES - DECADE OF UNCERTAINTY
At the beginning of 1958 it seemed that the proclamation of group areas in Springs would
be completed quickly. Agreement had been reached about the racial restructuring of the town
and in November 1959 the municipality sought ministerial approval for the final
disestablishment of Payneville. However, the proclamation of group areas in Springs only
occurred in 1964 and then only for white areas. Throughout the sixties and up to the mid
seventies the future of Payneville and its residents remained in the balance. From the early
sixties the National Party-controlled Council rigorously pursued the implementation of the
central government's plans. In particular it wanted the Payneville proclaimed a white group
area. This caused tremendous uncertainty among the residents of the old location. Various
forms of resistance caused delays in the government's plans. Despite the increasing
dominance by the National Party in localities throughout the East Rand, the government
could not succeed in the sixties to implement its grand restructuring of the region as it set
out to do from the mid fifties. This section discusses some of the reasons behind these
developments in Springs.
Transformation of local government
In the early sixties important changes were brought about to the structure of Transvaal's local
authorities. The Local Government (Administration and Elections) Ordinance of 1960
introduced Management Committees as the key bodies in the Councils.55 Until then Councils
operated by means of various standing committees which were responsible for carrying out
the different functions of the Council. From the beginning of 1961 the functions of these
standing committees were all taken over by the Management Committee. The old system was
regarded as cumbersome and inefficient. The running of Council business would now become
the responsibility of the five members of the Management Committees who were to be
elected by the Councillors after each municipal election. The new system also allowed for
council election only to be held every five years instead of the existing three years.
The stated aim of these changes was to ensure greater efficiency at local government level.
The longer period of office for Councillors meant that they had more time to get settled in
their positions and to carry out their mandates efficaciously. However, these changes also lent
a certain permanency to Councillor's positions and thus tended to make them less responsive
to the electorate. More seriously perhaps was the concentration power into fewer hands.
Although the Council retained the power to pass a motion of no confidence in the
Management Committee, the latter nevertheless had the propensity to act as a cabinet without
regular reference to the rest of the Council. Meetings of the Management Committee were
closed unless it gave permission to other councillors to attend. In early 1961 there was
considerable enthusiasm about the new system.56 However by the end of that year the editors
of Municipal Affairs, a prominent magazine for local authorities, complained that "The
statutory powers given to management committees are such that they, easily become
dictatorial powers - indeed, signs of a dictatorial attitude here and there have not been
wanting."57 The balance between dictatorship and accountability depended largely on the
composition of the Management Committees.
When the new system was introduced the Council and Management Committee were
dominated by UP Councillors but by early 1962 the National Party had gained control of the
Council. Up to this period the Springs Council was controlled first by South African Party
and then by UP members. From 1929 Springs elected SAP and UP members to parliament
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and as late as 1961 L. Taurog from the United Party was returned unopposed.58 However, in
the first elections held in March 1962 under the new local government system the United
Party lost its majority to the National Party.59 The National Party ran the election under the
banner of the National Action Committee, but all the candidates were well known and
leading National Party members, locally and regionally. As a result of their decisive victory
the National Party was able to take full control of the Management Committee (only NP
members were elected onto it). Councillor F.F. Deysel, a leading Nationalist, was elected
chairman of the Management Committee. The political stance of the latter was perhaps best
illustrated by his objection in 1961 to a Council resolution affirming loyalty to the Republic.
He strenuously opposed the inclusion of phrases such as "brotherhood of man*' and
"irrespective of race, colour and creed" because these "inferred equality between all races".60
The electoral victory for the National Party was indicative of a general shift on the East Rand
away from the UP. By the mid 1960s most members of parliament from this region were
Nationalists.61 The increasing dominance of the National Party at all levels of government
meant that there was greater co-operation between the different tiers of government. The
weakness of the opposition parties also ensured unanimity between these levels of
government on most political issues. This decade was extremely difficult for the black
population. The Springs Council was more uncompromising in its attitude towards them and
by the late sixties showed its willingness to use coercive measures to remove people from
the old location. The increasing political cohesion within the state did however not
immediately translate into successful implementation of apartheid policies, even with the
threat of coercion constantly hanging over the heads of black people. What then were the
main obstacles confronting the Nat-controlled Council in Springs?
Opposition from mining
One of the major stumbling blocks to the disestablishment of Payneville as an African
location was the 'strenuous opposition1 of the Grootvlei and Geduld mining companies to the
use of the land for residential areas for coloureds and Indian people;62 The Grootvlei
Proprietary Mines informed the Council that,
the attitude of [the] Company is that it is opposed to your Council's proposal
to use the land for Asiatic and Coloured occupation. Furthermore, it is felt
that, as the original purpose for which your Council was granted the right to
occupy the land, viz. a Native Township, is being abandoned, it is only right
that [the] Company should now regain the use of its own property for which
it never received any compensation from your Council.
... there is a distinct possibility that the ground to the east of the present
Payneville Township will be required for mining purposes and purposes
incidental thereto.63
There is no evidence to indicate that the mining company was serious about using the land
for mining and it seems more likely that its real motivation for opposing the Council's
proposal was that it preferred the land to be used for white occupation only. At this stage
the Council remained adamant that Payneville should be used for occupation by coloureds
and Indians, but it was forced to recommend that the deproclamation of Payneville as an
African location be delayed pending a decision about the future use of the land owned by
Grootvlei Mining Company.64 This was because in the event of the location being
deproclaimed, ownership of the land would revert to the mining companies, which would
give them sole authority over the future use of the land.
13
In spite of these problems, the Council still planned that coloured families should occupy
houses vacated by Africans. It reserved 300 and 100 houses for coloureds and Indians
respectively65. The Council's determination to house coloureds and Indians on this land was
confirmed by its repeated petitioning of the central government to support it against the
mining companies. Some councillors even suggested that the land in Payneville not owned
by the mining companies be proclaimed as group areas. The Council feared that Grootvlei
mining company might want to sell the land directly to coloureds and Indians, which would
mean the Council would not be compensated for the investments it had made in the location
since 1923. The objections of the mining houses did not prevent the Council from pursuing
its policy of removing Africans from the location. This was not the point of contention with
the mines. On the contrary, they concurred that African should be moved to the new
township. The Council wanted to ensure that the deproclamation of Payneville as an African
location should occur only when its reproclamation as a group area for coloureds and
Indians was guaranteed. The conflict between the Council and the mining companies over
the future of Payneville delayed the fmalisation of group areas demarcation until the mid
sixties.
Pressure from coloureds and Indians
While faced with these problems the Council came under increasing pressure from the
coloured and Indian communities to improve and develop their respective areas. In 1960 the
Coloured Welfare Committee rejected the proposed rent increases and the imposition of a
levy fund for the erection of a school in the location. According to them, the coloured
community did not benefit from improvements made in the location and would therefore
only pay the increased rents under protest.66 The Welfare Committee was created by the
Council to serve as a liaison between it and the coloured community. This body consisted
of prominent members of Payneville's coloured population, such as J.D. Jacobs and D.S.
Isaacs.67 Official recognition by the Council and the absence of alternative community
organisations, made the Welfare Committee the de facto representatives of coloureds.
However, the leadership of the Welfare Committee were primarily interested in furthering
the specific interests of the aspirant coloured middle class. Thus their main objection was
against the restrictions faced by coloureds who wanted to open businesses in the location.
In a letter to the secretary of the Department of Community Development they complained
that
... because Payneville is a Native location, Coloureds are not allowed to
trade or own taxis. These rights are enjoyed exclusively by Natives... The
Natives are able to trade in Payneville and in KwaThema, their new
location, and we are forced to buy from them and use their taxis.
We respectfully ask you to do everything in your power ... to proclaim
Payneville a Coloured area, as soon as possible.68
For these leaders a major benefit deriving from the creation of group areas would be the
elimination of competition from African and Indian businessmen. In a group area, coloured
businessmen would have almost exclusive access to the purchasing power of the coloured
community. Apartheid limited the development of the coloured middle class but it also offered
them some protection from the competition of other black businesses. However, the demands
for improvements in Payneville also arose because of the rapid decline in living conditions of
all the people. From the time that the government decided to deproclaim Payneville, no
improvements were effected there. As African people were being removed their houses were
destroyed. Thus while the overall population of the old location declined dramatically, the
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overcrowding in the remaining houses persisted. Throughout the sixties the National Party
controlled Council made no attempt to improve the living conditions of the residents.
The Indian residents of Bakerton were also becoming impatient with the lack of development
in their area. As in Payneville, living conditions were deteriorating rapidly. By the early sixties
overcrowding had. Between 1939 and 1969 Bakerton's population nearly doubled without the
construction of a single new house69 The removal of Payneville's residents posed a serious
threat to the viability of many of Bakerton's businesses. Some shopkeepers even resorted to
transporting miners from the hostel to do their shopping in Bakerton. Indian residents were
faced with rapidly deteriorating living conditions and a serious threat to their livelihoods.
The Council also refused to even consider making improvements in that area. In 1960 MR.
Khan and A.B. Gani applied for a stand to open a cinema "for the sole purpose of entertaining
Asiatics and Coloureds"70 The Council refused their request because it did not necessarily want
Indians to stay in the municipality and favoured their relocation to a regional township71 From
the perspective of the authorities any improvements would be a waste of money. Indian people
would therefore have to live in overcrowded conditions until it was finally decided to relocate
them to a regional township.
In the early sixties the Council favoured keeping coloureds in Springs. United Party mayor,
Jack Ellis, believed that
it might be to the advantage of Springs if all the Coloureds were to
establish themselves in Springs. Coloureds had attained a higher level of
development and were more reliable than natives. Coloureds usually
earned higher wages and would accordingly have a greater purchasing
power72
However, by 1963 the new Council rejected this argument. It now firmly supported regional
townships for Indians and coloureds. In an interview with government officials, including the
secretary of Community Development, the mayor of Springs, Mr. Deysel, argued that the
Council initially thought that coloureds should be retained in Springs as replacement labour for
Africans. However, it was now of the opinion that coloureds would never be beneficial in the
industrial development of the town73 Furthermore, he noted that the upgrading of facilities in
the old location would be very expensive and preferred that a totally new place should be found
for coloureds. Bearing these considerations in mind, he supported the removal of coloureds to
the regional location planned in Boksburg. The only problem the Council would then face
would be whether it would be required to make a financial contribution to the Boksburg
Council.
Meanwhile in 1965 the Council, under pressure from the Coloured Welfare Committee, agreed
that those coloured families living as lodgers in the location and in white residential areas
would be accommodated in municipal houses left by African families.74 This "concession" did
not amount to much. By 1967 coloured and African lodgers in Payneville were still living under
the same conditions because no new houses were being built in Kwa/Thema. This meant that
municipal houses in Payneville were not being vacated by Africans. Coloureds from the
location further complained that they were constantly raided by the police, were refused permits
by the Superintendent and wanted to be treated as a separate group from the African people.
In a memorandum sent to the Council in March 1967, the Welfare Committee urged that action
be taken urgently:
on behalf of the community, the committee humbly requests to proclaim
Payneville or any other area in Springs as a coloured 'group area' to give the
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people an opportunity to develop as an independent nation with its own identity.
The inexplicable delay in the proclamation of an area for our people has now
become unbearable. We have reached a point where we can no longer exercise
any patience. We feel, and you cannot blame us for this, that you have neglected
your role as guardians over us... For over 40 years we have been legally
exploited by the Natives... We therefore require urgent assistance and
protection.75
The Council responded by agreeing to allow coloureds to occupy owner-built houses bought
by the Council from African residents. These interim measures became more urgent because
the regional township located in Boksburg, viz. Reigerpark, could not yet accommodate the
coloured population from Springs.
Regional obstacles
As discussed earlier in this paper the regional plans formulated by the government formed an
important part of the restructuring of the East Rand. All Councils in this region were committed
to regional planning and their respective local plans were integrally linked to the regional
schemes first announced by the Mentz Committee and the SPC. By the early sixties the Springs
Council faced the dilemma of not being able to complete the racial balkanisation of its
municipality because of delays in the implementation of regional plans. In 1963 the secretary
of Community Development enumerated some of the reasons for the delay in the proclamation
of 'group areas' in Springs:
1. The biggest section of the proposed coloured and Indian area forms part of
proclaimed mining land;
2. It would be uneconomical to purchase mining land for the purposes of a
coloured 'group area', which would in any event have to re-planned;
3. 'Group areas' cannot be proclaimed in Springs until the Indian regional area
in Benoni had reached a reasonable point of development.
4. The replanning and development of the Indian regional township in Benoni
cannot be proclaimed until the coloureds living there were removed.
5. The removal of coloureds from Benoni to Boksburg was dependent on the
removal of Africans from Stirtonville and Galeview.
6. The proposed area for coloured and Indian occupation in Springs cannot be
effected until Africans were removed from there.76
Clearly, it was taking some time for the regional plans of the government to come to fruition.
The Springs Council found it'difficult to make any long term plans until the other parts of the
regional jigsaw puzzle fell into place. In 1962 the government informed the Council that
according to the Native (Urban Areas)Consolidation Act, coloureds living in African locations
had to be resettled by the end of that year. However, it conceded that in the absence of
alternative accommodation they should be allowed to remain in Payneville until such time as
finality was reached about where they would be settled.77 At this stage the Council officially
supported the idea of regional locations for coloureds and Indians, and wanted Payneville to
be considered as the regional area for coloured occupation. The prevarication of the Council
and the contradictory positions of its various members aggravated the uncertainty experienced
by the residents of Payneville and Bakerton. This was particularly disconcerting because at no
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stage were they consulted about the changes in the Council's position. Residents were most
anxious to see improvements in their living conditions, whether this occurred in the old location
or in the new regional townships. More importantly, they wanted these changes to occur as
quickly as possible. But they were to be disappointed as the government and the Council
continued to vacillate over the future of Payneville.
On the 21 February 1964 the government officially proclaimed Springs as a white group area
At the same time the Payneville/Bakerton complex was provisionally proclaimed as a
'controlled area'. Indians businessmen operating in town were allowed to continue trading there
but had to find residential sites elsewhere.78 These proclamations did little to ease black people's
anxieties. They had hoped the proclamation would lead to a speedy resolution of their
problems.79 The municipalities responsible for the development of regional townships for
Indians and coloureds, namely, Benoni and Boksburg respectively, indicated that progress was
slow in this regard.
At this stage the Nat-controlled Springs Council again changed its position about the future of
Payneville. It now recommended that Payneville and Bakerton be declared group areas for
whites.80 The Council believed that acceptance of its proposal would deal with the objections
of the mining houses and simultaneously ensure the removal of the black population from the
area. In making this recommendation the Springs Council reached another important turning
point in it its policy regarding Payneville and its residents. It no longer entertained the idea of
having Indians and coloureds in its municipality and wanted the old location to be used for the
exclusive benefit of the white community. According to the new plan KwaThema would be the
only area in Springs for black occupation. The residents of KwaThema would take care of the
town's labour needs and the people not essential to industry, that is to say, the coloured and
Indians could be disposed of and moved to another town.
In May 1968 Bakerton was advertised for proclamation as a coloured 'group areas' by the
GAB.81 I have not been able to locate the records of the GAB for this period and therefore do
not know what motivated it to suggest this. The Council records do not reveal whether they
were even consulted on this matter. Nevertheless, the Council was strongly opposed to the idea
because they wanted the whole Payneville/Bakerton complex to be proclaimed a white group
area. The main reason cited by the Council for the change in its position was that coloureds and
Indians were to be accommodated in other towns on the East Rand. But what was probably'
more significant was the concern of the Council and central government that Payneville was
located too close to developing white areas and a main road connecting two white residential
areas.82 By 1971 the central government had not taken any action with regards to the above
proposal and the Springs Council became anxious that a proclamation be passed speedily. This
was partly because residents of Payneville and Bakerton were demanding improvements and
development in their respective areas.
By 1971 the proposal to proclaim Payneville a white group area had the support of the Springs
Council and the Departments of Indian and Coloured Affairs, as well as from Mining and
Development.83 In a detailed memorandum outlining the motivation behind the proposed
proclamation, the Department of Development argued that the proclamation of Payneville as
a white group area would accelerate the resettlement of the location's residents to their rightful
townships on the East Rand, that is to say, Indians in Actonville and coloureds in the new
township in Nigel. In February 1973 a top level discussion was held between the Springs
Council and the ministers of Planning, Community Development and Indian Affairs to consider
the future of the location.84 The meeting confirmed that the cabinet supported one residential
area for Indians on the East Rand, namely, Actonville. However, due to the lack of facilities
there it appeared likely that the residents of Bakerton would have to reside in the old location
until the late seventies. Similarly, the new location for coloureds in Brakpan, Withok, was not
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nearing completion and it was anticipated that they would have to remain in Payneville for at
least another three years.85
In October 1973 some of these proposals were rescinded. At a meeting between the Group
Areas Boards and the Departments of Planning, Mining and Community Development it was
decided that the Indian communities from Springs and Nigel should not be moved because there
was not sufficient space for them at Actonville.86 Extensions to the latter township were
opposed by the Brakpan Council and the Department of Mining. This marked a shift from the
state's previous insistence that all the Indian people from the East Rand should reside in one
location. The relentless pressure from the affected communities for improvements in their lives
also affected the outlook of the government By early 1973 it acknowledged that any further
procrastination could potentially lead to a souring of relations between the government and the
Indian community.87 Under these circumstances the National Party felt that it could deviate
from its policies developed in the early fifties and agree to the creation of more Indian
townships on the East Rand. It was also agreed not to oppose the possible creation of a
coloured township in Alberton. These decisions were endorsed by the cabinet in September
1973.88
The question of what should happen to the coloured people from Payneville still remained
unresolved, however. In February 1973 the Council undertook a social survey of the location
and in particular of the living conditions of coloureds (at that point there were only a handful
of African people left in the location). They found that "there is a considerable amount of'dirt
and filth scattered around" and the toilets in the hostel were "dilapidated... to an extent that it
would be impossible to clean...properly."89 According to the Council the required improvements
to make the location habitable would be too expensive and suggested that temporary dwellings
be constructed for coloureds in KwaThema until such time that they could be moved to Withok.
This proposal was supported by the Minster of Coloured Affairs and the Deputy Minster of
Bantu Administration, Punt Janson.90 However, the coloured community rejected the proposal.91
Although no reasons are cited for the Welfare Committee's opposition, it would be safe to
assume that they remained opposed to living so close to African people. The Council accepted
their objections and agreed to invest in minimum upgrading, such as the installation of pans and
the improvement of street lighting. These improvements did not make much difference, and
when Helen Suzman visited the location in the late seventies she described it as "the worst slum
in the Transvaal".92 At this stage the terrible conditions in Payneville was threatening to become
a political embarrassment to the government and it hastened the process of relocating the
coloured people. However, the idea of moving them to a township in Nigel had been abandoned
and they were then moved to the new coloured township in Brakpan, namely, Geluksdal.
By the early seventies the government's commitment to regional plans formulated in the early
fifties was seriously challenged. It was unable to implement its grand regional plan in the
sixties and was now forced to abandon key aspects of that plan. The central government focus
on "bantustan" development in the sixties meant that less resources were directed to urban
township development compared to the fifties. The consequent slowdown in urban housing
provision meant that residents from the old location could not be moved to the new townships
as quickly as was initially hoped. The resistance against removals in the early sixties also
played an important part in further delaying the government's plans. The paper will finally focus
on some of these important aspects.
Forced removals and resistance
In the first six years of its existence KwaThema rapidly grew into one of the biggest African
Townships on the Reef. By 1960 close to 6000 houses were built and the population of the
township rocketed to about 37 000. As discussed earlier in the paper, lodgers and squatters
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were keen to move to the new township, The same did not apply for the legal occupants of
municipal houses and homeowners. They were reluctant to leave Payneville because many of
them had invested a considerable amount money and time on their homes over many decades
and were not impressed with the alternative accommodation in KwaThema.93
In the sixties the homeowners represented primarily by the Payneville Advisory Board became
the main opponents to the removal schemes. The Board raised various objections to the
Council's plans in an attempt to delay the final removal of the location. In 1958 the Board
expressed its shock that the Council had advertised Payneville to be proclaimed a group area
for coloureds and Indians.94 When a similar advertisement was placed in the Advertiser in 1959
the Board was confronted by angry residents who accused them of being "sell outs" because
it was assumed that they were aware of and consented to the Council's plans.95
The main area of contention between the residents of Payneville and the Council was over the
compensation to be paid to homeowners on their removal to KwaThema. The Department of
Native Affairs set out the guidelines for such payment in a memorandum, which recommended
the appointment of assessors to determine the value of properties.96 The basis of compensation
approved by the Minister of Native Affairs was that owners would be paid the standing value
of the house less the value of any material retained by them. In addition people would be
compensated for costs incurred for the demolition of the building and transport to the new
township, unless these were carried out by the local authority. The government's on
compensation stipulated that the amount paid to residents could not exceed 25% of the value
of the house and recommended that only 15% be paid because of the "inflated value of
properties". Municipalities could also pay homeowners a consolation fee "for the loss of the
home which is demolished and in consideration of the inconvenience and expense incidental
to removal".97 This was mainly to be paid to people deriving income from subletting.
From the outset the Payneville Advisory Board campaigned to secure the best compensation
deal for residents and aimed to use the process of valuations to cause further delays in the
disestablishment of the location. When asked by the Council to appoint an assessor to represent
the people of the location, the Board resolved to postpone this by a month to allow it "adequate
time to consider the matter fully."98 In January 1960 the Board presented the Council with a
detailed memorandum outlining its major concerns about the removal of Payneville's African
residents. Some of the most important questions raised for the consideration of the Council
were the following:
a) As we belong to the poorest paid section of the Community, we would
like to know how are we then expected to finance the building of our new
homes at Kwa-Thema. This point troubles us very much and we consider
other factors in this regard to be of secondary importance.
We, therefore, suggest that a loan system should be introduced by
Council, payable under reasonable terms and conditions.
b) ... the Board is of the opinion that people resident in Municipal
dwellings, who have effected improvements in the form of additional
rooms, be compensated for improvements made.
c) ... we are of the opinion that Kwa-Thema is so planned that when fully
developed will be a big modern Township, and we do not visualise its
removal being contemplated within the foreseeable future... In the
circumstances, we, therefore, request very respectfully the Town council
of Springs to consider the request of allowing us the right of freehold
tenure, or alternatively a 99 year lease.99
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The Council was amenable to the proposal of making loans available to those who wanted to
build their own homes. Loans of up to 95% would permissible if the value of the house did not
exceed £250. However, the Council rejected the other proposals arguing that residents of
municipal dwellings already had the benefit of their improvements and could not expect to be
paid for those improvements when they left. Also, the government opposed the granting of
freehold to Africans. The maximum period of a lease was 30 years100 The Board also
questioned the underlying reasons for the removal of the location, stating that they could not
see how this action accorded with the government and Council's claim to "give the Native
satisfaction". The UP dominated Council argued that the removal of Payneville was an
instruction from the government which they were obliged to carry out. The Board also proposed
a formula for the valuation of properties which would increase the amounts received by owners
and declared the Town Engineer's valuation of properties carried out in 1956 to be null and
void.101 This was rejected by the Council which accepted the valuation method outlined by the
government. The response of the Council to the memorandum did not satisfy the Board and for
the next few years it continued campaigning for its demands.
After the completion of valuations, the Council decided that homeowners should be offered a
price not exceeding two-thirds of the valuation of their properties. Furthermore, it kept the
location's residents in ignorance of the original valuations so that homeowners did not know
what offers to accept from the Council for their properties. The Board objected accused the
Council of disregarding the guidelines as set out by the government.102 The Board's unhappiness
reflected the mood of residents. By mid 1962 only seven people had offered to sell their
properties to the Council. By the end of that year the number of people offering to sell their
properties had increased to 59 and the Council anticipated to spend R34 923 on these
properties. However, this figure represented less than 5% of the R900 000 the Council expected
to pay to residents.103
In 1961 the Payneville Board appointed attorneys to assist it in dealing with the local
authorities. The Council agreed to meet a deputation consisting of the Advisory Board and its
lawyers "for the sake of good relations".104 At the end of 1962 the same attorneys demanded
that the Council make available the valuations to the Board and homeowners. Failing this, the
Board threatened to take the matter to the Supreme Court. The Council, now under the control
of the National Party, dismissed the demands of the Board and argued that the problem rested
with the Minster of Bantu Affairs. At a meeting of the Advisory Board the acting Director of
Non-European Affairs stated that valuation would only be disclosed "when a forceful
disestablishment was underway".105 For the Board this attitude could only be interpreted as an
attempt by the Council to minimise the amount paid to homeowners. Board member, W.
Sokhupe, berated the Council for their selfishness:
Today we are told of a new thing, that people were moving voluntarily.
Why were valuators employed? Why is Council refusing with the
valuations? Why does the Council want to buy our houses? The Springs
council is a surprising body, it would not do anything that could benefit
its Non-European Community. It is monopolistic in that it wants to own
all the business interests in the townships. We want our valuations as we
may lose them with the march of time.106
In January 1964 the Board requested the Department of Bantu Administration to withdraw the
authority it had granted to the Council to deal with the above matters. However, these
objections were ignored and the Council proceeded with its plans. By the beginning of 1964
only 82 homeowners were paid out by the Council, representing an increase of only 23 over
the 1962 figure.107 The decline in the rate of removals from Payneville caused the Nationalist-
controlled Council considerable irritation. In June 1964 it concluded that forceful measures
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would be necessary to move occupants of municipal houses to KwaThema. The Council was
prepared to undertake these measures even though they acknowledged that the main reason for
people's unwillingness to leave the old location was because they could not afford the higher
cost of living in KwaThema.
The rate of the removals was affected by the slowdown in the construction of houses in
KwaThema. The natural increase of the township's population also placed demands on the new
houses. This was acknowledged by the authorities who agreed that the 832 houses built in the
early sixties would probably mostly be taken up by the residents of KwaThema rather than
those removed from Payneville. It was only in the late sixties with the construction of a further
800 houses that the removal from Payneville regained momentum. Between October 1961 and
mid 1968 only 287 privately owned houses and 199 municipal houses out of a total of 879 and
565 respectively, were demolished.108 Between 1968 and 1969 a further 102 private homes and
139 municipal houses were demolished. This indicated the availability of new houses in
Kwathema.109
Most importantly, however, was the determination of the Council forcibly to remove residents
from the old location. As in other locations the Council would pin notices to the doors of
people to be removed, often giving them only a few day's notice. Municipal trucks would come
into the location and collect their belongings, whether they were ready or willing to move or
not.110 By the late sixties the Springs Council was anxious to proclaim the location a white
group area and wanted the quick removal of the black residents. In the face of the Council's
determination to use force to remove residents, the Advisory Board could not offer effective
resistance. As a result residents were forced to accept the compensation paid by the Council.
Today, this issue has come back to haunt the Springs authorities as people claim that they were
robbed by the Council and are demanding proper compensation for their lost properties. Kenny
Madalane's mother was paid only R560 for her house in 1969. According to him the house
which had five rooms, a pantry and outside rooms was worth much more than that.
The continued oppositional stance of the Payneville Advisory Board was an important features
of the sixties and was in sharp contrast to the conservatism of the KwaThema Advisory Board.
On the one hand, the Payneville Board represented the interests of homeowners who faced
tremendous losses and the remnants of the location's elite whose sources of livelihood were
threatened by the removals. The latter had no guarantee of maintaining their position in the new
township. The KwaThema Board, on the other hand, represented the narrow interests of its own
members and the elite of the new township. Hence it was concerned mainly with matters such
as trading licences and the acquisition of more shops. Many of them had benefitted from the
establishment of KwaThema and were desperately keen to ensure their privileged position.
However, the Payneville Board was by no means radical, as its call for Kwathema to be
declared a "Bantu Homeland" shows.111 In a certain sense the Advisory Board acted in much
the same way as the Coloured Welfare Committee, which worked exclusively in the interests
of coloured people, even if it was to the detriment of others. In 1963 the Payneville Board
objected to the fact coloured people were given preference to occupy houses vacated by African
people. It argued that the local authorities favoured coloured residents who even came from
other areas to occupy houses in the location. This meant that African people who qualified in
terms of the Influx Control Regulations could not find houses in Payneville, in spite of the fact
that the location was specifically designed for Africans. The Board proposed that coloureds
people should not be allocated houses in the location unless all Africans were housed.'12
This was indicative of the deteriorating relations between the people in Payneville. The
apartheid policies of the government and the declining living conditions brought about by those
policies, tended to polarise the community along racial lines over the struggle for dwindling
21
resources. In the absence of an organisation to direct the discontent of the people against the
state, the people turned against each other. The heightened racial consciousness was exacerbated
by the middle class leaders who saw in segregation and separate development an opportunity
for their own upward social mobility. Under the circumstances existing in the sixties it seemed
as if people could only advance as racially defined groups. In any event the government would
not tolerate anything else. The sense of community and integration (and at times even working
class unity) which had existed from the mid-twenties were torn asunder by the success of
apartheid in the sixties.
Mass opposition to the Group Areas Act and forced removals was virtually absent in the sixties,
precisely at the time when thousands of people suffered as a consequence of their
implementation. The crushing of the liberation movements had a devastating effect on the
consciousness of the population. Moses Magudulela remembers that "everyone in the location
was afraid. Very few people tried to do something but they failed."113 The fear of detention and
even death forced people into acquiescence. The Springs Council also threatened people with
deportation to the "bantustans" and a handful of residents accepted this rather than be moved
against their will to KwaThema.114 Businessmen in Bakerton were hard hit by the removals as
their clientele base was virtually wiped out in the sixties. But they also felt powerless to oppose
the authorities.
In the absence of effective opposition the authorities could proceed with the racial restructuring
of Springs and the whole East Rand with virtual impunity. The lack of development in the
Payneville/Bakerton area resulted in a terrible deterioration of living conditions which the
Council seemed mainly unperturbed by. In 1972/73 the last African families were forcibly
removed from the location and for the next few years Payneville was exclusively occupied by
just under two thousand coloured people. They were finally removed in 1978/79, leaving only
Bakerton with its original residents.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to argue that when the National Party came to power it did so with
a strong ideological commitment to racial segregation. However, in the first few years of its
rule it had not yet worked out precisely how to achieve its goals. The promulgation of the GAA
was perhaps more a declaration of serious intent than a blueprint for racial segregation. The
details on how to enforce racial segregation were formulated in the early fifties. So too were
the plans to restructure the urban landscapes. By the mid fifties the government had overcome
numerous obstacles and had devised a very clear plan for the restructuring of the
Witwatersrand. These plans were strongly infused by a commitment to impose "proper
planning" and co-ordination of the development of urban areas. From the mid fifties to the early
seventies the government and local authorities would remain strongly committed to the
implementation of these plans.
However, the authorities faced a number of obstacles to the implementation of its schemes,
which in the case of Springs caused considerable delay in the final implementation of the GAA
and removal of Payneville. Initially the creation of KwaThema was welcomed as an
improvement in the living conditions of thousands of people. But by the end of the fifties the
limits of this reform had already been exposed and the remaining residents of Payneville
became more resolute in their opposition to the location's disestablishment. The Payneville
Advisory Board, which represented the interests of the location's elite, was in the forefront of
this resistance. The Board did not mobilise mass action against the removals. After the
smashing of the liberation movement this type of action was probable not even contemplated.
However, the elite did employ other delaying tactics which had a measure of success. But the
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the balance of forces were heavily weighted against the black opposition during this period and
from the late sixties the Nat-controlled Council was able forcibly to remove the last African
families from Payneville.
The government's commitment to plans formulated in the early fifties came under tremendous
pressure from the mid sixties, so that in the early seventies it was forced partially to amend its
grand plan for the creation of regional locations. This was not a major retreat by the
government because it had already largely achieved its main goal, namely, the creation of
massive regional townships for the African population. Under these circumstances it was
prepared to make minor compromises to the coloured and Indian populations.
A key aim of this paper has been to challenge what are perhaps unstated assumptions about the
sixties. Undoubtedly, this was the golden period of apartheid rule. But to conclude from this
that the ruling class achieved unbridled success over the black population would be a mistake.
The sixties were crucial in the implementation of apartheid policies, which were largely
formulated in the fifties. Thus in order to gain a better understanding of the dynamics involved
in the making of apartheid it is necessary that the veil be lifted from the sixties.
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